Company
Latvian company making routers, switches and wireless gear that run its RouterOS operating system, widely used by small ISPs and businesses.
CERT Polska disclosed MikroTrick, a chain of two RouterOS flaws that gives unauthenticated admin on routers whose SSH faces the internet. Attacks were already under way at disclosure. Reachable SSH is the one condition the chain needs.
Reality
Federal agencies now have three separate patch deadlines inside twelve days. The lowest-scoring pair of the five flaws added to KEV is the one with a documented 24-day intrusion campaign behind it.
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CISA says an integer underflow in MikroTik RouterOS web management gives an unauthenticated attacker root with one crafted request on versions below 7.24. No exploitation has been reported, but MikroTik's fix advice sets a 7.23 floor that CISA's own affected range still covers.
Perspective Coverage
3 publishersReality
CVE-2026-86060, the privilege half of the MikroTrick chain CERT Polska analysed, lets an SSH client set its own policy mask and take RouterOS full-group admin. The September 2026 releases fix it, and a scan found 9,559 devices reachable over SSH.
Reality
CERT Polska dated successful attacks to at least September 2 and published its warning on September 5, so operators who deferred the RouterOS update have three days of configuration changes to read as well as a patch to install.
Perspective Coverage
8 publishersReality
MikroTik published RouterOS fixes in four branches with no CVE and no technical detail. The same upgrade runs a compromise check and writes a critical log entry marking the device Flagged.
Perspective Coverage
3 publishersReality
CERT Polska rebuilt the MikroTrick attack chain from MikroTik's unlabeled September 3 patch and had a working exploit for CVE-2026-86060 in about an hour. The fix quietly disables a rogue "ops" account, evidence the chain was already exploited in the wild.
Reality
CERT Polska's breakdown of the September RouterOS compromises names two bugs, CVE-2026-67279 and CVE-2026-86060, and the forum logs that match the chain start on September 2, a day before MikroTik shipped fixes.
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CERT Polska confirmed exploitation of the MikroTrick chain on September 5, and the two bugs need no password and no private key, only a reachable SSH service, so the firewall rule scopes the risk before any build audit can.
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Two RouterOS flaws published to NVD on 2026-09-05 both sit in code that runs before a session has proven who it is. An upgrade closes them. Which management services answer from the internet is still an open question.
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Politico reported that ENISA and CERT-EU ran an advanced OpenAI model over an EU project's code and got four fixed flaws out of it. Poland's CERT, doing the same kind of work, said it tested every hypothesis on real systems.
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CERT Polska reports active exploitation on internet-facing MikroTik routers, where the chain needs no private key and no user interaction, and the fixed builds close the bypass without explaining how attackers learned the account details.
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