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Security Independently confirmed2 publishers 2 min read Published Updated

Three Cyrillic letters still let lookalike domains through Chromium's address-bar check

Researchers at haveibeensquatted.com found three Cyrillic letters that still break Chromium's whole-script lookalike check in current Chrome. A name built on one can display close to a real brand, so the address bar is a weaker check than users are taught.

The Watch · Security desk

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Illustration accompanying Three Cyrillic letters still let lookalike domains through Chromium's address-bar check
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Chrome 148 left three of five breaker letters usable Cyrillic breaker characters that pass Chromium's stage 1 checks, before and after Chrome 148 adopted Unicode 17.

Before-and-after figure: Chrome 147 and earlier accept all five breaker letters the researchers named. In Chrome 148 and later, three of the five still pass, because Unicode 17 reclassified two.

Chrome 148 left three of five breaker letters usable
MeasureValueAs ofClaim
Chrome 147 and earlier5 breaker letters19
Chrome 148 and later3 breaker letters21

What happened

  • Under ICU 78, 64 lowercase Cyrillic characters are both allowed by Chromium and absent from its 29-character Cyrillic lookalike list.
  • Chrome 148, released in May 2026, adopted ICU 78.2 and Unicode 17, and the Unicode reclassification now blocks two of the five breakers the researchers named.
  • The work revisits Xudong Zheng's April 2017 Cyrillic .com, drawn by Chrome, Firefox and Opera as near-identical to a real domain and shown by Chromium as Punycode ever since.

Why it matters

  • Who's exposed exposure Machines still on Chrome 147 or earlier accept all five breaker characters, so slow browser updates widen the set of lookalikes that render as Unicode.
  • What it limits constraint Mail clients draw sender addresses by their own rules, so a change to Chromium's lookalike list would not cover a deceptive address in an email From line.
  • What it sets up precedent Chrome 148 closed two breakers only because Unicode 17 reclassified them, so the remaining three stay usable until Chromium edits its 29-character list or Unicode reclassifies them as well.

The weak point is in stage 1, in the whole-script confusable rule. Chromium runs the first part of its check through International Components for Unicode (ICU) with a narrowed set of allowed characters, then adds rules of its own [8]. The confusable rule is all-or-nothing. A single Cyrillic character missing from the lookalike list takes the whole label outside the rule [9]. The researchers call that character a breaker [9]. To be useful it must sit in Chromium's allowed set, stay off the lookalike list, and still pass for a Latin letter to someone reading the address bar [10].

Many characters clear the two software tests. Few look enough like a Latin letter to fool a reader. The researchers name five that do [18], about one in thirteen of the candidates [22]. One is a letter used in Kazakh, Mongolian and Tatar that Chromium does not list as a lookalike [12].

A breaker gets a label through stage 1 and no further [6]. Every letter in the label must also be Cyrillic. Several Latin letters have no Cyrillic substitute in Chromium's allowed set, and Chrome 148 removed the substitutes for two more [20]. That limits which brand names can be spelled at all. Stage 2 then reduces the full hostname to comparison strings, called skeletons, and checks them against a bundled list of popular domains. If the hostname matches a different site, the whole name goes back to Punycode [11]. The registry also decides which characters a name may contain [13]. We'd rate the technique exploitable today, but only against brand names that can be written entirely in permitted Cyrillic. The researchers say they found two edge cases that still let a convincing lookalike through [5]. They credit the breaker technique for the name Chrome 154 displays in their opening screenshot [4].

The address-bar advice dates from when domain names could only hold English letters, digits and a hyphen [14]. Names have been able to use almost any writing system since 2003 [15]. For those names the advice depends on Chromium showing deceptive-looking labels in Punycode instead [1]. In our view, reading the address bar still helps, but it has to sit alongside controls that do not rely on a person reading the name correctly. The published findings do not report any attacker using the technique, and they do not describe a Chromium change for the three characters that still pass.

What to watch

  • Whether Chromium adds the three remaining breaker characters to its Cyrillic lookalike list, or a later ICU or Unicode release reclassifies them.
  • Registrations of all-Cyrillic labels using these characters that spell popular brand names, the first sign of the technique moving from research into phishing.
  • Fuller detail on the researchers' second edge case, and whether it reaches stage 2 for brand names the first one cannot spell.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence60
Adoption
Not scored
Hype gap+15
Incentives
Not scored
Confidence62
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    Chromium, the engine behind Chrome, Edge and other browsers, applies a display check: if a name looks built to deceive, the address bar shows its encoded Punycode form instead.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  2. [2]

    Mail clients make their own choice about how to draw a sender's address.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  3. [3]

    The research investigates whether it is still possible to register a domain that looks like a well-known one and have Chromium-based browsers render it close to the real thing.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  4. [4]

    The post includes a screenshot of Chrome 154 displaying a lookalike name, and says the breaker technique is the mechanism behind the name in its introduction.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  5. [5]

    The research finds two edge cases in Chrome's handling of internationalized domain names that still let a convincing lookalike through; the first is in the whole-script confusable check.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  6. [6]

    Chromium's display decision has two stages and a name must pass both to show as Unicode: stage 1 checks each xn-- label through SafeToDisplayAsUnicode() with the TLD as context; stage 2 checks the whole hostname against a list of popular domains and runs only when every label passes stage 1.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  7. [7]

    Stage 1 runs seven checks on each label in a fixed order, and the first one that fails sends the name to Punycode.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  8. [8]

    Chromium runs the first part of the check through International Components for Unicode (ICU), configured with a narrowed set of allowed characters, and then applies rules of its own.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  9. [9]

    The whole-script confusable rule is all-or-nothing, so a single Cyrillic character that is not on the lookalike list keeps the whole label out of it; the post calls that character a 'breaker'.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  10. [10]

    A useful breaker must sit in Chromium's allowed Unicode set (clearing check #1), be missing from the Cyrillic lookalike list (so check #6 does not fire), and still look enough like a Latin letter that a reader can mistake it.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  11. [11]

    In stage 2 Chromium reduces the hostname to comparison skeletons and compares them against a bundled list of popular domains; a match for a different site sends the entire hostname back to Punycode even though every label passed stage 1.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  12. [12]

    A Cyrillic letter used in Kazakh, Mongolian and Tatar is not on Chromium's lookalike list.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  13. [13]

    Registries decide separately which characters a domain name may contain.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  14. [14]

    The 'check the address bar' advice assumes the name there can be read correctly, which held while domain names could only contain English letters, digits, and a hyphen.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  15. [15]

    Since 2003 domain names can use almost any writing system.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  16. [16]

    In April 2017, Xudong Zheng registered a Cyrillic .com that Chrome, Firefox and Opera drew as almost indistinguishable from a real domain; Chromium has shown that name as Punycode ever since.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  17. [17]

    Under ICU 78 and the 29-character list, 64 lowercase Cyrillic characters are in Chromium's allowed set and missing from the Cyrillic lookalike list.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  18. [18]

    The research identifies five breakers; the first three meet the allowed-set and lookalike-list conditions today, and the last two met the allowed-set condition only before Chrome 148.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  19. [19]

    Unicode 17.0 moved two of the breaker characters from Recommended to Uncommon_Use; Chrome 148, released in May 2026, moved to ICU 78.2, which carries Unicode 17, so both now fail check #1. Chrome 147 and earlier accept all five.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  20. [20]

    A useful lookalike label must be written wholly in Cyrillic; several Latin letters have no Cyrillic substitute in Chromium's allowed set, and Chrome 148 also removed the substitutes for two more.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  21. [21]

    Three of the five identified breakers still pass Chromium's stage 1 conditions in Chrome 148 and later.

    Derived Supported
  22. [22]

    The five named breakers are about one in thirteen of the 64 characters that meet Chromium's first two conditions.

    Derived Supported

Sources

2 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. haveibeensquatted.com

    1 article · October 9, 2026

    https://haveibeensquatted.com/blog/
  2. scworld.com

    1 article · October 11, 2026

    New characters allow lookalike domains to fool browsers

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