Skip to content

Security Independently confirmed3 publishers 3 min read Published Updated

Leaked Bauman files name the GRU department that fed graduates into APT28 and Sandworm

A media consortium and DomainTools worked through more than 2,000 records from a Moscow engineering department that appears on no public org chart, and found roughly 250 students on a documented path into Russian military intelligence.

The Watch · Security desk

Send a correction

What happened

  • An international media consortium reviewed more than 2,000 internal documents from Bauman Moscow State Technical University describing a training program run for Russian military intelligence.
  • It served elements of the Russian General Staff and taught three military specialties: special intelligence, operational information-technical effects, and information-technology protection.
  • Major General Viktor Netyksho, who commanded Unit 26165, appears in the department's teaching and oversight structure according to the leaked records.

Why it matters

  • What's now possible capability Analysts can now tie an individual to a GRU cyber unit through a graduation year and a department roster rather than through malware or infrastructure reuse, which is a far harder link to dispute.
  • What it limits constraint Modelling Russian units as split between offensive and defensive specialists gets harder when the same operator was graded on intrusion detection, firmware implant hunting and information-technical effects in one course.
  • Who's exposed exposure Everyone named in the files inherits the legal position Netyksho already occupies, and the 2018 indictment shows what the United States does with documented GRU service records.
  • What it sets up precedent Influence work graded as coursework alongside offensive training means future operations should be expected to arrive from one pipeline rather than from separate propaganda and intrusion shops.

Next story · Security · Oct 8

ESET traces at least 21 months of changes to UAC-0099's MatchBoil downloader

Confirmed4 publishers

The staffing numbers are worth walking through first. Roughly 250 career and reserve students passed through Department No. 4 over six academic years [11], which averages about 42 per intake [21]. Researchers estimate that 10 to 15 students each year were selected for GRU-related assignments before graduating [12], so 60 to 90 people across the six years, between a quarter and a third of everyone who went through [22]. Those are staffing numbers, and they hold across six consecutive cohorts.

The curriculum tells you what the graduates were built to do. Course materials define "information-technical weapons" as tools and methods designed to alter, destroy, copy, block, or manipulate information [13]. Red-team and blue-team functions are taught as one discipline rather than two tracks [14]. Technical protection instruction covered cryptography and steganography, code analysis and intrusion detection, hardware inspection, the discovery of physical implants, and the identification of undocumented device functions [15]. DomainTools also flags a malware-analysis and threat intelligence program in the files that had not previously been reported [16]. One advanced practical assignment required a social-media video built around what the materials called "manipulation, pressure, and hidden propaganda" [7]. It counted as coursework.

Provenance deserves separating from content. The records run through 2025 and cover academic and administrative material [9]. A DarkForums user known as "Losyash" may have shared the data, and it has not been confirmed that the account obtained it in the first place [17]. What holds the reading up is that two sets of eyes worked the same corpus: the consortium of The Insider, The Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, Delfi, VSquare and FRONTSTORY.PL [4], and DomainTools researchers analysing the files independently [5].

None of this changes a patch queue: the files carry no indicators and no new vulnerability, but what they do change is the resolution of attribution. Unit staffing has generally been inferred from tooling and tradecraft overlap; here there is a department inside Bauman's Military Training Center that does not appear on the university's public org chart [10], dated cohorts, and at least one named individual. Reporting places graduates in Military Unit 26165, associated with APT28 [2], and Unit 74455, associated with Sandworm [2], and identifies Aleksei Kondrashov, a 2024 graduate, as linked to 74455 [3]. Major General Viktor Netyksho sits in the department's teaching and oversight structure, having commanded Unit 26165 and the 85th Main Special Service Center [18]. He was one of 12 GRU officers indicted in the United States in 2018 over interference in the 2016 presidential election [19].

Put together, the finding takes a clear shape. A unit whose operators have been tracked as Fancy Bear, Sofacy and STRONTIUM for a decade [20] draws from an accredited engineering faculty with a known intake rate, known instructors, and a syllabus that trains intrusion and influence work side by side [6]. Planning assumptions about attrition, burn rates from sanctions and indictments, and how fast these units regenerate capability now have a number attached to them.

What to watch

  • Whether the consortium publishes a fuller graduate roster, which would let prosecutors and sanctions bodies work from graduation year instead of tradecraft overlap.
  • Whether Bauman or the Russian General Staff renames, relocates or restructures Department No. 4 now that its intake and instructors are documented.
  • Whether any named Department No. 4 graduate turns up in a future indictment or designation tied to Unit 26165 or Unit 74455.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence55
Adoption
Not scored
Hype gap+10
Incentives
Not scored
Confidence60

Perspective Coverage

3 publishers
Builder
Builder 25%
Operator
Operator 65%
Investor
Investor 10%
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    Department No. 4 served several elements of the Russian General Staff and trained students across three specialties: special intelligence, operational information-technical effects, and information-technology protection.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  2. [2]

    Reporting identified graduates assigned to GRU Military Unit 26165, associated with APT28, and Military Unit 74455, associated with Sandworm.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  3. [3]

    Aleksei Kondrashov, a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, is identified as linked to Military Unit 74455, the GRU's Main Centre for Special Technologies.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  4. [4]

    The investigation was carried out by a group of media outlets including The Insider, The Guardian, Le Monde, Der Spiegel, Delfi, VSquare and FRONTSTORY.PL.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  5. [5]

    DomainTools researchers analyzed the leaked files independently of the media consortium.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  6. [6]

    In practice the Department No. 4 courses included espionage, offensive cyber operations, electronic reconnaissance, secure systems, and influence operations.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  7. [7]

    One advanced practical assignment required the creation of a social-media video built around what the course materials called "manipulation, pressure, and hidden propaganda," and this counted as coursework.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  8. [8]

    More than 2,000 internal documents from Bauman Moscow State Technical University have been reviewed by an international media consortium.

    Reported Supported Source: securityaffairs.com, reporting on a DomainTools analysisView cited source
  9. [9]

    The leaked files span academic and administrative records through 2025.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  10. [10]

    Department No. 4, also called "Special Training," operated inside Bauman's Military Training Center and does not appear anywhere on the university's public organizational chart.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  11. [11]

    Around 250 career and reserve students went through the Department No. 4 program over six academic years.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  12. [12]

    Researchers estimate that 10 to 15 students each year were selected for GRU-related assignments before graduating.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  13. [13]

    Course materials defined "information-technical weapons" as tools and methods designed to alter, destroy, copy, block, or manipulate information.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  14. [14]

    Red-team and blue-team functions were treated as a single discipline rather than separate tracks, mirroring how Russian military doctrine deploys cyber operators.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  15. [15]

    Technical protection training covered cryptography and steganography, code analysis and intrusion detection, hardware inspection, the discovery of physical implants, and the identification of undocumented device functions.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  16. [16]

    The files reveal an underreported malware-analysis and cyber threat intelligence program.

    Reported Supported Source: DomainTools reportView cited source
  17. [17]

    A DarkForums user known as "Losyash" may have shared the data, but it has not been confirmed that the account originally obtained the records.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  18. [18]

    The leaked records identify Major General Viktor Netyksho, former commander of Military Unit 26165 and the 85th Main Special Service Center, as part of Department No. 4's teaching and oversight structure.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  19. [19]

    Netyksho was among the 12 GRU officers indicted by the United States in 2018 for interference in the 2016 presidential election.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  20. [20]

    Military Unit 26165 is the GRU formation publicly associated with APT28, also tracked as Fancy Bear, Sofacy and STRONTIUM.

    Reported SupportedView cited source
  21. [21]

    Roughly 250 students over six academic years averages about 42 students per intake.

    Derived Supported
  22. [22]

    At 10 to 15 students selected per year, six years of intakes yields 60 to 90 GRU-assigned graduates, or 24 to 36 percent of the roughly 250 students who went through the program.

    Derived Supported

Sources

3 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. schneier.com

    1 article · September 1, 2026

    Leaked Russian Cyber-Operations Training Materials
  2. scworld.com

    1 article · September 2, 2026

    Leaked documents reveal Russian military cyber recruitment pipeline
  3. securityaffairs.com

    1 article · September 3, 2026

    2,000 Leaked Documents Reveal How Russia Turns Engineering Students Into GRU Cyber Operators

Topics and entities

Topics

  • State-sponsored threat groups
  • Russian Military Cyber Operations

Entities