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Security Reports disagree4 publishers 3 min read Published Updated

Silver Fox delivered ValleyRAT through signed adware that users whitelist themselves

Kaspersky traced one submitted installer to a modified Chinese wallpaper tool whose signed executable sideloads a malicious libcef.dll, and the same installer switches Windows Defender off before it ever runs.

The Watch · Security desk

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What happened

  • A Kaspersky client submitted installer MD5 c24e99f9437feacaa63766a3cde3fe3d for detection; it was first classified as adware, then found to run an infection chain that delivers the ValleyRAT backdoor.
  • The installer plants a modified copy of QN Wallpaper and starts its signed executable, which loads a malicious libcef.dll from the same directory so the backdoor executes inside a trusted, signed process.
  • Kaspersky attributes the activity to Silver Fox on geography and payload, and lists command-and-control at 103.45.66.18 on ports 441, 442 and 443 and 192.253.225.173 on ports 6666 and 8888.
  • Cato Networks documented Silver Fox abusing legitimate applications for DLL sideloading at a Japanese manufacturer about five weeks earlier, and the libcef.dll filename appeared in a 2025 ValleyRAT loader.

Why it matters

  • Who's exposed exposure Any endpoint whose owner excluded this wallpaper tool to keep its features working is reachable by the full backdoor, and the resulting activity reads in logs as approved, signed software behaving normally.
  • What it costs cost Killing the process triggers a blue screen because it's flagged critical, so eviction takes more than a kill, and each infected host becomes a scheduled outage instead of a remote cleanup.
  • What it limits constraint Signer-based and path-based allowlisting cannot separate this build from the real tool, which pushes detection onto what a signed process loads at runtime rather than who signed the executable.
  • What doesn't add up contradiction Kaspersky presents the whitelisting habit as the likely motive, but the same installer also disables Defender outright, so the exclusion list only makes the operator's job easier, without being something the infection depends on.

The sideloaded library keeps the wallpaper tool from working. Every function libcef.dll exports is placed into an infinite sleep, so neither QnWallpaper.exe nor QnwPlayer.exe does what the original program exists to do, and the sample's advertising features stay inert while the infection chain runs [10][6]. Kaspersky notes a fallback: if that sleep is ever interrupted, the code loads the genuine library's functions into memory, provided it can find the original on the system [10]. This build never delivers on the pretext an administrator relies on when whitelisting software like this: keeping its useful features from being blocked [19].

Malicious execution begins in DllMain when the library loads [11]. A second entry point, an export named RunDLL, is present and never called by QnWallpaper; Kaspersky's reading is that the operators intended to invoke it by hand through rundll32, or through an executable that was not in the downloaded package [11]. Once running, the code checks whether the current user is in the Administrators group and relaunches with runas if not, then selects its payload by host process: a file called PeLoader inside QnWallpaper.exe, a resource in libcef.dll itself inside QnwPlayer.exe [12][13].

Sequencing is what complicates the exclusion-list story. Persistence lands first, through autorun entries for the wallpaper tool plus a file extension association and a matching file dropped in the Startup folder [7][20]. The installer then writes DisableAntiSpyware and only afterwards starts the signed binary [1]. Elevation via runas happens later still, inside the loaded DLL [12]. That Defender write is redundant on a host where the install directory is already excluded, but on any other host it removes the need for the operator to rely on user hygiene.

The scale figures are annual rather than campaign-specific. Kaspersky recorded more than 100,000 detections of ValleyRAT and associated malware across 2026 against more than 1,500 unique users, mostly in China and India, spanning all of the year's activity rather than this route [26]. Taking both floors at face value gives roughly 67 detections per affected user [25]. That ratio is what affiliate and ad-network distribution looks like from the detection side: the same loaders arriving repeatedly at the same machines. The adware route carries no victim count of its own, and the analysis rests on a single installer submitted by a customer [16].

The packaging points at volume rather than a named target. The installer varies its behaviour according to the two-letter suffix in its filename, which Kaspersky reads as misdirection, and the chain opens meeting.tencent.com as a decoy page [21][23]. Kaspersky tracked the same group in an earlier tax-themed campaign against organisations in India and Russia, a different wrapper around the same loading trick [18].

What to watch

  • Whether a later sample actually calls the unused RunDLL export, which would expose a stage missing from this package.
  • Whether other signed utilities distributed from keansoft.cn get repackaged the same way.
  • Whether Kaspersky or anyone else attaches a victim count to the adware delivery route rather than to ValleyRAT overall.

Clarity's read

What the record supports and how the coverage leans. The claims behind it follow.

Reality

Evidence72
Adoption
Not scored
Hype gap+15
Incentives30
Confidence66

Perspective Coverage

4 publishers
Builder
Builder 24%
Operator
Operator 67%
Investor
Investor 9%
Why these scores

Claim ledger

Ranked by verification strength, evidence, and original report placement.

  1. [1]

    After unpacking, the installer uses the DisableAntiSpyware registry key to disable Windows Defender and then launches QnWallpaper.exe.

    Reported Supported
  2. [2]

    The threat actor known as Silver Fox has been observed distributing the ValleyRAT backdoor disguised as a signed Chinese adware application, running the malware under a trusted process to slip past users who add such software to their antivirus exclusions.

    Reported Supported
  3. [3]

    Kaspersky said the attack's geography and payload point to Silver Fox as the likely group behind it.

    Reported Supported Source: Kaspersky
  4. [4]

    ValleyRAT, also tracked as Winos 4.0, hands the operator full control of the compromised machine.

    Reported Supported
  5. [5]

    A client asked Kaspersky to analyse a file with MD5 hash c24e99f9437feacaa63766a3cde3fe3d and add it to the detection database; it was initially classified as adware, but suspicious network activity prompted deeper analysis, which found it triggers an infection chain delivering the ValleyRAT backdoor.

    Reported Supported
  6. [6]

    The sample's advertising functionality does not even work; instead it triggers the infection chain.

    Reported Supported
  7. [7]

    Regardless of the file name, the installer deploys a modified Chinese desktop wallpaper management tool called QN Wallpaper (qnwallpaper[.]keansoft[.]cn) and adds it to the registry's autorun entries; the original version is genuine adware that delivers bundled partner apps and displays ad banners.

    Reported Supported
  8. [8]

    The QN Wallpaper modules and malicious components are unpacked to C:\Program Files\QNWallpaper\5.4.0.1662\<random string of letters and digits>.

    Reported Supported
  9. [9]

    QnWallpaper.exe has dependencies in libcef.dll, so the library is loaded when the process starts; QnWallpaper.exe also launches QnwPlayer.exe, which likewise calls libcef.dll. With the library executing inside a legitimately signed process, the backdoor runs without triggering controls that trust the signature.

    Reported Supported
  10. [10]

    QnWallpaper and QnwPlayer will not function correctly because the functions exported from libcef.dll are put into an infinite sleep; in case that sleep is ever interrupted, the attackers implemented a function that loads all necessary functions from the original library into memory, provided it can locate that library on the system.

    Reported Supported
  11. [11]

    The malicious functionality in libcef.dll is invoked by a call to DllMain, which runs automatically when the library is loaded; the library also contains an export named RunDLL that also initiates the malicious code and that QnWallpaper never calls. Kaspersky suspects the attackers intended to invoke it manually via rundll32 or planned to use a separate executable not included in the downloaded package.

    Reported Supported
  12. [12]

    Inside the function Kaspersky calls mw_entry, the malware checks whether the current user belongs to the Administrators group and which process the DLL is running inside; if the user is not an Administrators member, it attempts to obtain administrator privileges using the runas utility.

    Reported Supported
  13. [13]

    Once it has administrator privileges, the code selects the payload by host process: loaded from the PeLoader file when running inside QnWallpaper.exe, and from a libcef.dll resource when running inside QnwPlayer.exe.

    Reported Supported
  14. [14]

    ValleyRAT can flag its own process as critical, so that any attempt to terminate it triggers a blue screen of death.

    Reported Supported
  15. [15]

    Kaspersky said ValleyRAT is a sophisticated backdoor capable of collecting sensitive data such as keystrokes and clipboard contents, taking screenshots, and delivering additional malicious modules.

    Reported Supported Source: Kaspersky
  16. [16]

    Kaspersky's account is based on a single installer submitted by a customer, and the report stops short of attaching a victim count to the adware route.

    Reported Supported
  17. [17]

    In a campaign against a Japanese manufacturer about five weeks earlier, Cato Networks documented what it called Silver Fox's newly observed abuse of legitimate applications for DLL sideloading, and the same libcef.dll filename had already featured in a 2025 ValleyRAT loader.

    Reported Supported Source: Cato Networks
  18. [18]

    Kaspersky tracked the same group in an earlier tax-themed campaign against organizations in India and Russia.

    Reported Supported
  19. [19]

    The attackers may have chosen this distribution method because the adware was signed by the developer, and because users often manually add these apps to exclusions so their useful features do not get blocked.

    Reported Supported
  20. [20]

    When the library is loaded, code runs that ensures QnWallpaper.exe persists at startup by adding a file extension association and dropping a file with the corresponding extension in the user's Start Menu Programs Startup directory.

    Reported Supported
  21. [21]

    The installer performed different actions depending on the two-letter suffix used in the file name, positioned just before the numeric string; these actions are most likely designed to divert the user's attention away from the malicious functionality.

    Reported Supported
  22. [22]

    Kaspersky listed command-and-control servers 103.45.66.18 on ports 441, 442 and 443, and 192.253.225.173 on ports 6666 and 8888.

    Reported Supported
  23. [23]

    Domains in the chain include qnwallpaper[.]keansoft[.]cn, the abused adware's download site, and meeting[.]tencent[.]com, a legitimate page opened as a decoy.

    Reported Supported
  24. [24]

    Kaspersky urged users to avoid installing software of questionable reputation and never to add such software to security solutions' exclusion lists, and urged organisations to set clear policies on third-party software on work devices.

    Reported Supported
  25. [25]

    Taking Kaspersky's two 2026 floors at face value gives roughly 67 detections per affected user.

    Derived Supported
  26. [26]

    Across 2026 Kaspersky recorded more than 100,000 detections of ValleyRAT and associated malware affecting over 1,500 unique users, mostly in China and India, a figure spanning all of the year's ValleyRAT activity rather than this campaign alone.

    Reported Contested

Sources

4 independent publishers whose own reporting we read for this story.

  1. scworld.com

    1 article · September 1, 2026

    Silver Fox uses adware to distribute ValleyRAT backdoor
  2. securelist.com

    1 article · August 31, 2026

    ValleyRAT masquerading as adware
  3. securityaffairs.com

    1 article · August 31, 2026

    ValleyRAT: When Legitimate Software Becomes a Malware Delivery Tool
  4. thehackernews.com

    1 article · August 31, 2026

    ValleyRAT Backdoor Hides in Signed Adware That Users Add to Antivirus Exclusions

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